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Abstract
Deep neural networks have achieved substantial achievements in several
computer vision areas, but have vulnerabilities that are often fooled by adversar-
ial examples that are not recognized by humans. This is an important issue for
security or medical applications. In this paper, we propose an ensemble model
training framework with random layer sampling to improve the robustness of
deep neural networks. In the proposed training framework, we generate various
sampled model through the random layer sampling and update the weight of the
sampled model. After the ensemble models are trained, it can hide the gradient
efficiently and avoid the gradient-based attack by the random layer sampling
method. To evaluate our proposed method, comprehensive and comparative ex-
periments have been conducted on three datasets. Experimental results show
that the proposed method improves the adversarial robustness.
1 Introduction
Recently, deep learning models have shown exceptionally good performance in var-
ious computer vision tasks such as image classification [9, 24], object detection
[22, 23], semantic segmentation [3, 16]. However, several studies have revealed
that deep learning methods are vulnerable in case images are intervened by small
perturbations that are not even perceptible for human-beings. These perturbed im-
ages are called adversarial examples, and the procedure to create such adversarial
examples is called adversarial attack.
The adversarial attack algorithms could be categorized into two approaches. The
one is a white-box attack and the other one is a black-box attack. In the white-box
* Both authors contributed equally to this work.
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attacks, the attacker could access to the model’s parameters, while in the black-box
attacks, the attacker could not access to the model’s parameters. In this paper, we fo-
cus on handling white-box attacks. In the white-box attacks, interruptions of visually
imperceptible perturbations to original images could lead to erroneous results. The
perturbations of these approaches are generated based on gradients. The gradient-
based adversarial attack methods could simply and effectively cause malfunctions of
target networks. Hence, the presence of adversarial examples has brought up chal-
lenges of great importance for security-critical computer vision applications.
To enhance the deep learning model against adversarial examples, several meth-
ods have been proposed. Previous adversarial defense methods have been proposed:
Randomization [20] to make the attack ineffective, denoising [6], ensemble training
[20], and training the model with adversarial examples [1, 17]. It has been demon-
strated that training with adversarial examples is the most effective way to improve
the model robustness [1]. However, it takes large training time and impractical on
large-scale datasets [28].
To increase the robustness of the deep network, in recent studies, randomization
and obfuscation are reported as practically effective strategies to improve the adver-
sarial robustness. The example of randomization is noise addition at different levels
of the system [29], randomized lossy compression [6], random projections [27], and
random feature sampling [5]. The key idea of these approaches is to hide the gradi-
ent of the network by randomization. The adversarial attack is blunted in white box
situations, where the defender can effectively perturb the weight through random-
ness and make a difference when the attacker makes adversarial examples based on
a specific weight. In other words, increasing the diversity of the networks plays an
important role in defense.
One of the simple ways to increase the model diversity and improve the robust-
ness is to generate ensemble models. It has been empirically observed by Smith et
al. [13] that ensemble networks that are trained with different random initialization
can be robust to adversarial examples. Pang et al. [20] proposed an ensemble model
training method to promote the diversity among the predictions. They proposed the
adaptive diversity promoting regularizer to make individual network predict orthog-
onally. Most of these ensemble-based approaches showed prominently in terms of
adversarial robustness. However, these ensemble models require a large number of
parameters to improve the adversarial robustness.
In this paper, we focus on tackling the problem of network parameter increase
in the ensemble models when improving the adversarial robustness. To this end, we
propose a novel ensemble model training framework with random layer sampling
and group optimization strategy. In the proposed ensemble models training frame-
work, the ensemble model set is defined with M sub-models. Each sub-model has the
same structure with L layers and they have different weights. From the model set, we
sample the layers categorically through the proposed random layer sampling method.
Then, we generate sampled models that have the same structure as the sub-model.
Each sampled model predicts sample outputs. Through the proposed random layer
sampling method, it is possible to increase possible recombination cases exponen-
tially by simply adding linear parameters. Also, we train the ensemble models with
group optimization to promote the ensemble diversity. Through group optimization,
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we could predict diverse sample outputs that are robust to adversarial examples. In
summary, there are two advantages of the proposed method. Firstly, we can gener-
ate various ensemble models combination only with a few numbers of sub-models.
Secondly, since our proposed layer sampling method generates sampled model ran-
domly, we can effectively take a gradient ambiguity and avoid reproducible for the
adversarial attack. Then, the sample outputs guarantee diversity. Therefore, we
could predict robust prediction against adversarial examples. The contributions of
our paper can be summarized below:
• We propose a novel ensemble model training framework with random layer
sampling. Through the proposed framework, we can effectively construct
ML ensemble models with M sub-models which has L layers. Compared to
conventional ensemble methods, our method can generate a large number of
predictions with a few number of sub-models. Then, the diversity of the pre-
dictions is increased with the random layer sampling training framework and
group optimization strategy.
• Our method effectively hides the full gradient of network and improves the
adversarial robustness. It is mainly due to the reason that our method predicts
various sample outputs from different model combinations. Experimental re-
sults show that our method effectively improves the adversarial robustness
compared with other ensemble-based defense methods.
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Attack Method
The deep neural networks have been shown to be highly vulnerable to adversarial
examples. It was first discovered by Szegedy et al. [26]. Then, Goodfellow et al. [8]
proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM). It is a fast and single-step adversarial
attack version of [26]. It performs a single step update on the original sample x along
the direction of the gradient of a loss function. After that, Moosavi et al. designed
the DeepFool attack [18] starting from the assumption that models are fully linear.
Under this assumption, there is a polyhedron that can separate individual classes.
Recently, more powerful and effective attacks including C&W [2], PGD [17], EAD
[4] are proposed to fool the networks. As stronger attack methods are reported, the
need for developing better defense methods is increased.
2.2 Adversarial Defense Method
To improve the modelâA˘Z´s robustness against adversarial examples, several meth-
ods have been reported. There are many approaches including distillation-based
approaches [21], adversarial training approaches [1, 17], and ensemble training ap-
proaches [7, 13, 15, 20]. In this section, we mainly describe the ensemble training
approaches.
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Figure 1: Overall procedure of the proposed ensemble model training framework
with random layer sampling method. The ensemble model set consists of M sub-
models. Each sub-model has L layers with different weights. From the ensemble
model set, we sample each layer and construct sampled model. Then, we construct
K different sampled models and update each sampled model parameter at once.
Pang et al. [20] improves the adversarial robustness by promoting ensemble di-
versity with Adaptive Diversity Promoting (ADP) regularization. They trained the
ensemble model through the ADP regularization method. Through the ensemble di-
versity, the non-maximal predictions of each model are mutually orthogonal, then
predicts robust output. Smith et al. [25] proposed ensemble models training method
with predictive uncertainty estimation and detecting adversarial example. By quan-
tifying the predictive uncertainty, they could optimize the ensemble models that are
robust to adversarial examples. It could also detect adversarial examples with pre-
dictive uncertainty. Although these ensemble model training methods could improve
the adversarial robustness, to improve the adversarial robustness, a large number
of parameters are required. Another way to construct ensemble models is to add the
noise in the layer or dropout the weight. The noise addition or dropout method can be
interpreted as ensemble model combination [13] where the predictions are averaged
over an ensemble of neurons. Liu et al. [15] reported a random self-ensemble (RSE)
training for improving the robustness of deep neural models. They add a noise layer
before each convolution layer in both training and prediction phases. They showed
that the algorithm is equivalent to ensemble a huge amount of noisy models together,
and ensure that the ensemble model can generalize well. They further prove the fact
that the proposed method is equivalent to adding a Lipchitz regularization and thus
can improve the robustness of neural models. Dhillon et al. [7] proposed stochas-
tic activation pruning for robust adversarial defense. During the forward pass, they
prune a subset of the activations in each layer. Then, they scale up the remaining
activations to normalize the dynamic range of the inputs to the subsequent layer.
3 Proposed Method
In this section, we describe our proposed ensemble model training framework. Fig-
ure 1 shows an overview of the proposed ensemble model training framework with
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random layer sampling and group optimization. As shown in the figure, we construct
an ensemble model set with M duplicate sub-models. The sub-model consists of L
layers, and the weight of each layer is differently initialized over sub-models. To
train the ensemble model set, we sample the layer from the ensemble model set by
the proposed random layer sampling method. Then, we construct K sampled mod-
els. The sampled model predicts sample output fk(x). From the sampled models,
we optimize the sampled models at once with sample mean prediction to increase
the diversity between sampled models. In the testing phase, we construct N different
ensemble models by the proposed random layer sampling and decide a final decision
by averaging predictions of N sampled models. The details of the proposed random
layer sampling method and training framework will be described in the following
subsections.
3.1 Random Layer Sampling
In this section, we describe how to sample the layer and generate a sampled model.
As shown in Figure 1, we design an ensemble model set with M duplicate sub-
models which consists of L layers. Each sub-model has the same structure while
having different weights. From the ensemble model set, we sample the layers by our
proposed Random Layer Sampling (RLS) method. In the proposed RLS method, we
sample layers with rl(m) where l denotes the layer index, m denotes the sub-model
index, and rl(m) denotes the categorical random variable that indicates whether each
layer is selected or not. In order to ensure that each layer is selected from one sub-
model, we constrain the rl(m) as follows
M
∑
m=1
rl(m) = 1, (1)
rl ∼ categorical(x1,x2,x3, . . . ,xM;µ1,µ2,µ3, . . . ,µM). (2)
Therefore, the feed-forward operation can be described as
wl = rl⊗Wl , (3)
z(l+1) = wl ∗ y(l), (4)
y(l+1) = σ(z(l+1)), (5)
where Wl denotes a set of weights in lth convolution layer, wl denotes a sampled
weight from categorical random variables, ⊗ denotes element-wise multiplication, *
denotes a convolution operator, yl denotes a feature vector of lth layer, z(l+1) denotes
the output vector of lth layer, and σ is an activation function. Eq. 3 denotes that
we sample only one weight of the layer in the M sub-models. By stacking these
randomly sampled layers, we can construct sampled models which have the same
structure but have different weights. Through the RLS, we can generate various en-
semble models that have different weight effectively. Theoretically, we can generate
ML different ensemble models only with the M sub-models.
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Figure 2: Comparison of defense scenarios between (a) basic ensemble method and
(b) our method.
3.2 Training for Adversarial Robustness with Ensemble
Diversity
It is widely known that ensemble of several individual models could improve the
adversarial robustness [7, 13, 15, 20]. For the adversarial robustness, the diversity
among individual sub-models should be sufficiently guaranteed. To guarantee the
diversity, we trained the ensemble models by group optimization strategy. As shown
in Figure 1, let fk(x) = p(y | x, wˆk) be a prediction of the sampled model where
wˆk denotes the sampled weights, and F(x) = 1K ∑ fk(x) be a mean prediction of the
sampled models. Following the description of [11, 30], the ensemble model diversity
can be defined as
α( fk | x) = ( fk(x)−F(x))2. (6)
Therefore, the diversity of the ensemble model can be defined as the difference be-
tween individual sub-model prediction and mean prediction of sampled model. If
we set the difference between ground-truth and sample output as mean square error,
it can be represented as MSE( fk | x) = (y− fk(x))2. The mean square error can be
decomposed into
E[MSE(F | x)] = E[MSE( f | x)]−E[α¯( f | x)]. (7)
To minimize sample mean prediction, we grouping K different sampled models
through the proposed random layer sampling method. By minimizing E[MSE(F |
x)], the set of individual sampled model is optimized and the diversity is guaranteed.
3.3 Adversarial Defense Scenario
In this section, we describe the adversarial defense scenario. Figure 2 shows the com-
parison of the defense scenario between the basic ensemble method and our method.
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As shown in Figure 2 (a), in the basic ensemble model, if the sub-model is attacked,
the prediction is corrupted by the adversarial attack. Note that the prediction score is
calculated by averaging M predictions. To reduce the effect of the adversarial attack,
it is required to increase the number of sub-models but it is limited in real-world
applications.
Compared to the basic ensemble approach, our method could generate ML dif-
ferent ensemble models effectively only with M sub-models. As shown in Figure
2 (b), although a sampled model is attacked, at the test time, our method randomly
samples N different models with the RLS method. It is very low probability to sam-
ple the same sub-model which is attacked (1/ML). Since the weight of the attacked
model is different from the ones of the sampled models, the gradients of the attacked
model is different from sampled models. Therefore, the attack algorithm does not
work properly in the sampled models. As a result, the robustness is improved in the
proposed method.
4 Experiments
4.1 Datasets and Implementation Details
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed method, we use three widely studied
datasets-MNIST [14], CIFAR10 [10], and SVHN [19] dataset. The MNIST dataset
is a collection of handwritten digits in classes 0 to 9. It consists of 60,000 training
images and 10,000 test images. SVHN dataset is similar to the MNIST dataset but
colorful street view house numbers. It has 10 classes and consists of 63,257 training
images and 26,032 test images. The CIFAR10 dataset consists of 60,000 images
with 10 classes. It consists of 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images. Each
class has 6,000 images. The pixel value of images is scaled to be in an interval [-1,
1]. We evaluate our method with two publicly available networks (ResNet-50 [9]
and VGG-16 [24]). To verify that the proposed method is compact while robust to
adversarial attack, we only use two sub-models and 3 sampled models for training
(M=2, K=3). All networks are trained from scratch by using an SGD optimizer. The
initial learning rate is set as 0.01 and divided by 10 every 50 epochs. We use a weight
decay of 5×10−4 and a momentum of 0.9. We run the training process for 50 epochs
on the MNIST, 150 epochs on the CIFAR10, and the SVHN.
4.2 Performance Comparison under Adversarial Attacks
We evaluate the performance against well-known white-box attacks. We apply five
adversarial attack methods (FGSM [8], PGD [17], Deepfool [18], C&W [2], and
EAD [4]) on three datasets. For the adversarial attack setting, the iteration step is set
to be 10 for PGD with a step size of ε/10 where ε denotes a magnitude of noise. For
the C&W and EAD, we perform with constant c. With a selected c, we then run 1000
iterations of gradient descent with Adam optimizer with the learning rate of 0.01.
Table 1 and 2 show the classification accuracy on each adversarial example on
ResNet-50 and VGG-16, respectively. We conduct experiments with various set-
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Table 1: Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial examples. Models consist of
Resnet-50.
MNIST CIFAR-10 SVHN
Attack Method Para. Baseline Ours Para. Baseline Ours Para. Baseline Ours
No Attack - 99.5 99.6 - 95.1 96.7 - 96.2 97.6
FGSM ε=0.1 89.5 98.6 ε=0.01 45.4 65.1 ε=0.05 40.4 56.2ε=0.2 44.1 70.4 ε=0.02 35.6 48.1 ε=0.1 28.5 41.0
PGD ε=0.05 68.3 86.4 ε=0.01 36.4 70.9 ε=0.01 66.0 88.4ε=0.1 30.8 62.5 ε=0.02 12.0 39.2 ε=0.02 35.3 68.5
Deepfool - 3.7 91.4 - 0.4 84.9 - 1.1 84.1
C&W c=0.1 43.7 83.9 c=0.01 41.7 91.7 c=0.01 38.8 92.3c=1 13.8 75.3 c=0.1 16.4 87.9 c=0.1 9.5 75.7
EAD c=0.1 35.9 68.0 c=0.01 26.2 79.0 c=0.01 29.8 80.3c=1 12.8 48.3 c=0.1 10.8 47.6 c=0.1 5.9 69.2
Table 2: Classification accuracy (%) on adversarial examples. Models consist of
VGG-16.
MNIST CIFAR-10 SVHN
Attack Method Para. Baseline RSL Para. Baseline RSL Para. Baseline RSL
No Attack - 98.2 99.1 - 92.1 93.7 - 96.5 97.0
FGSM ε=0.4 67.3 84.3 ε=0.1 45.4 53.3 ε=0.1 27.8 40.1ε=0.8 16.7 28.6 ε=0.2 22.0 28.1 ε=0.2 17.4 26.8
PGD ε=0.1 66.55 83.9 ε=0.01 54.7 78.8 ε=0.02 42.5 74.0ε=0.2 23.57 49.1 ε=0.02 37.4 58.9 ε=0.04 18.4 45.0
Deepfool - 1.7 82.2 - 0.9 67.9 - 1.3 68.4
C&W c=0.1 58.5 89.5 c=0.01 61.0 91.5 c=0.01 47.1 88.6c=1 15.2 65.8 c=0.1 18.2 74.3 c=0.1 13.9 68.5
EAD c=0.1 48.1 65.7 c=0.01 51.4 84.3 c=0.01 18.0 67.4c=1 22.2 45.6 c=0.1 28.5 44.9 c=0.1 3.8 61.2
tings. âA˘IJNo AttackâA˘I˙ denotes the normal setting when testing with normal data.
In the case of baseline, we train a sub-model and attacking that sub-model. In the
case of our method, we sample a model from the model set by proposed random layer
sampling and attack the sampled network. Then, we evaluate accuracy by mean of
10 sample output (M=2, N=10). As shown in the tables, our method significantly
improves adversarial robustness compared to baseline. Especially, in the case of re-
cently proposed powerful attack methods C&W and EAD, the accuracy of the base-
line is significantly dropped on three datasets. In the case of our method, although
the adversarial attack is powerful, the accuracy does not drop significantly. Although
the attacker knows the full structure and the weight of the sampled model, it attacks
different sampled models. With the proposed random layer selection method, we can
effectively defend adversarial examples with the various sampled model.
4.3 Performance Comparison with Other Defense Methods
We compare our method with other defense methods. We use a Resnet-50 network
as a backbone and test on the CIFAR-10 dataset. Table 3 shows classification ac-
curacy comparison with other ensemble-based defense methods. We set the attack
parameters ( ε , c, and number of iteration) same as section 4.2. As shown in the
table, our method outperforms other ensemble methods. Compared with other de-
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Table 3: Classification accuracy comparison with other defense methods on CIFAR-
10.
CIFAR-10
Defense FGSM PGD Deepfool C&W EAD
No defense 45.4 36.4 0.4 41.7 26.2
ADP [20] 70.2 61.7 20.3 52.0 61.9
RSE [15] 51.8 45.8 82.1 91.2 75.4
Stochastic Dropout [7] 58.5 59.0 56.4 53.4 38.1
Ours 65.1 70.9 84.9 91.7 79.0
Table 4: Classification accuracy comparison on CIFAR-10 dataset when the attacker
attacks multiple sampled models.
Model
# of Attacked
Sampled Model FGSM PGD C&W
Resnet-50
1 65.1 70.9 91.7
5 60.5 65.3 84.5
10 58.7 60.9 82.3
15 63.1 60.2 81.7
fense methods, our proposed method improves ensemble diversity through group
optimization strategy. Also, the sampled models can hide the gradient through ran-
dom layer sampling. Through the experiment, we prove that the proposed method
effectively improves the robustness against to adversarial attack.
4.4 Multiple Attack and Defense
If the attacker knows that the model consists of more than two models, the attacker
could attack multiple models. In the multiple attacker scenario, our method could
still operate robustly. To verify that our method is also robust to multiple attacks,
we conduct multiple attack and defense scenario. Table 4 shows the results of the
proposed method when the attacker attacks sampled models. As shown in the table,
there are only a few accuracies drops even the attacker attacks multiple attacks. In
the case of FGSM, since it is hard to generate an adversarial example that could
attack more than 10 sampled models, the attacks not working properly. Also, it is
impossible to attack all sampled networks. Therefore, it can be interpreted that our
method is also robust to multiple attacks.
4.5 Ensemble Diversity Comparison
One of the main contributions of our method is to guarantee the ensemble model
diversity. To verify this, we measure the diversity of the proposed method by using
Interrater Agreement (IA) score [12, 30]. This score explicitly quantifies the diver-
sity of ensemble models. The lower the IA, the more diverse the predictions of the
models. In the case of Stochastic Dropout, RSE, and our method, we use 10 samples
and repeat 10 times. Since the ADP method uses a fixed model, we implement only
one time. Table 5 shows the IA scores comparison with other ensemble methods. As
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Table 5: Interrater Agreement (IA) score comparison with other ensemble methods.
Dataset Stochastic Dropout RSE ADP Ours
MNIST 0.53 ± 0.005 0.55 ± 0.015 0.52 0.43 ± 0.021
CIFAR-10 0.58 ± 0.004 0.60 ± 0.031 0.54 0.51 ± 0.018
SVHN 0.62 ± 0.003 0.66 ± 0.024 0.62 0.58 ± 0.023
Table 6: Classification accuracy on adversarial examples according to the number of
sample.
Method # of Samples FGSM PGD C&W
Base ensemble 3 50.2 53.7 46.75 51.1 55.2 47.6
Our ensemble
5 64.8 70.3 91.5
10 65.2 70.8 91.7
15 65.1 70.9 91.7
shown in the table, our method shows a low IA score than other methods. It means
that our proposed method guarantees the diversity.
4.6 Effect of Number of Sample for Adversarial Robustness
We analyze the effect of the number of samples for adversarial robustness. Table 6
shows the classification accuracy according to the number of samples. In the case of
the Base ensemble, we construct 3 and 5 ResNet-50 sub-models and train individu-
ally. Then, we select one sub-model and generate adversarial examples. As shown
in the table, as the number of samples increase, the adversarial robustness is also
increased. However, to improve the robustness, a large number of parameters are re-
quired. On the contrary, in the proposed method, with only two sub-models, it is pos-
sible to generate various sampled models with random layer sampling. As a result,
our method can hide the weight of the attacked sampled-model effectively. There-
fore, our method effectively defense the adversarial examples with a small number
of sub-models.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents an ensemble model training framework with a random layer sam-
pling method for adversarial robustness. In the proposed method, we design a model
set consist of multiple sub-models and construct sampled models with the random
layer sampling method. The sampled models are trained by a group optimization
strategy to guarantee diversity. After the training, our method predicts various sam-
ple outputs by recombination of layers. Therefore, our method effectively hides the
full gradient of the models and improves the adversarial robustness. Comprehensive
and comparative experiments show that the proposed method could defend adversar-
ial attacks effectively.
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